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I. INTRODUCTION
A dominant issue in the literature on benefit-cost analysis has been the appropriateness or otherwise of using market rates of discount for the intertemporal aggregation of benefits and costs. One important argument for using a non-market rate of discount is based on the insight that under certain assumptions individuals would voluntarily enter into a social contract committing them to increase their total savings, for the benefit of future generations, above the level they chose privately.
This divergence of collective and individual behavior, which is a manifestation of the famous "prisoner's dilemma"_ problem of game theory, was postulated by Baumol [1952] and Eckstein [1958] an~ was called the "isolation paradox" by Sen [1961] in a study of optimal saving.
In two celebrated papers Marglin [1963a Marglin [ , 1963b argued that in an economy containing both private saving for benevolent purposes and public investment the existence of an isolation paradox can justify the use of a discount rate for benefit-cost analysis which is below the private rate of return on savings. This argument is now widely recognized in 1 .the literature on benefit-cost methodology , with major criticisms concentrating on the empirical validity of the assumptions about individual preferences postulated in the formal development of the model in Sen [1967) . 2 Since the parameters concerned are difficult to measure, the likelihood that the isolation paradox will indeed exist has become largely a matter of individual judgement. On the other hand, there has been essentially no challenge to the conclusion that if an isolation paradox of the NarglinSen type does exist the appropriate rate of discount for use in benefitcost analysis lies below the market rate of discount.
The present paper takes issue with this conclusion. Taking the isolation paradox argument on its own terms, it aims to show that the appropriate rate of discount for use in benefit-cost analysis is the market rate of discount, whether the isolation paradox actually holds or not. This is done by constructing a simple general equilibrium model reflecting the inter-generational benevolence lying at the heart of the isolation paradox analysis. Like Marglin and Sen, we ignore other capital market distortions. This model is presented in Section II. In Section III it is then shown that the appropriate rate of discount for use in benefit-cost analysis in this model is the market rate of discount, re-· gardless of whether the Marglin-Sen assumptions on individual preferences and distributional mechanisms, implying the existence of an isolation paradox, are imposed on the model. The alternative approach advocated hy ~arglin [1936h] and Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen [1972] imposes far more formidable data requirements and C·.mld at best produce results which are equivalent to the calculation of net present value using the market rate of discount: but in Section IV we argue that in general no such equivalence is possible.
II. PRIVATE SAVINGS AND THE ISOLATION PARADOX

Structure of the Model
We begin with a simple general equilibrium model which captures the essence of the problem. The well known problems of generalizing 3 from two period savings models require us to begin with three periods (generations), denoted 0, 1 and 2. Since the focus of the paper is on inter-generational rather than intragenerational savinr,s, we imagine the life of each generation to be focused on a single discrete point in time and, for simplicity, the interval between generations will correspond to a fixed period of time. In;ra-generational savings a~ thereby ignored,
The existence of an isolation paradox in any generation requires that that generation contain a minimum of two individuals. So the first two generations, 0 and 1, each contain two individuals, denoted 1 and 2 and 3 and 4, respectively. But since the isolation paradox cannot arise for the final generation (there is no subsequent generation for whom to save), it will contain only one individual, denoted 5.
Each individual receives an income in lump sum form. He can then in principle make donations of two types: (i) to his contemporary, or
(ii) to members of the next generation. The individual in the final period is an exception since, for vim, donations of hoth types are infeasible.
Type (ii) donations earn a rate of return o and the proceeds are divided among the members of the succeeding generation. We assume that this rate of retur P is unaffected by any of the marginal savings decisions or public investment projects occurring within the model and for simplicity we will suppose it to be constant over time. It is convenient to think of p of as the rate of return available on an external capital market. The way type (ii) donations are divided among members of the next generation is, for now, left open. It may be determined by the donor himself (say, through a will), by some other, more rigid rule of distribution beyond his control, or by some combination of the two, but the donor is nevertheless aware of the way his donations are to be distributed. In keeping with the Marglin-Sen assumptions, it will presently be assumed that individual preferences are such that type (i) donations never occur while (except for period 2) all individuals make positive type (ii) donations.
The utility of each individual depends on his own consumption, that of his contemporary and that of the members of the succeeding generation.
The individual in the final generation is again the obvious exception. 
and 1 (Ul
where U~ -au 1 /acj and u! is a shorthand notation for (A 13 u; + (1 -A 13 ) U~). 
The story for individuals 2, 3 and 4 is identical. No one contributes voluntarily to his contemporary, but each saves voluntarily for the benefit of his successors. These future benefits are discounted by each individual at the rate p, which is called alternatively the private rate of discount (return) or market rate of discount (return).
The Isolation Paradox
Imagine individuals 1 and 2 to have separately chosen their optimal levels of savings, behaving atomistically as above. We now consider a contract between them which collllllits each to raise his total level of savings by one unit. These additional savings earn the rate of return p as before and the proceeds are distributed to individuals 3 and 4 in the ' 3 3 proportions y and 1 -y , respectively. The effect on individual l's welfare is given by (4) Similarly, (5) The debate in the literature has centered on whether or not it is reasonable to expect both the private optimal savings conditions derived above and du 1 > 0 and dU 2 > O in (4) and (5) In a masterly paper, Sen (1967) sets out several sets of sufficient but not necessary conditions for this to be so. By substituting the optimal private savings condition (3) into (4), we see that au 1 > 0 is equivalent to
. 13 On the other hand, if A is a rigidly specified rule of distribution, outside the control of individual 1, it is possible that u; f uz.
But if the same rigid rule applies t.o the distribution of collective 13 3 savings as to private savings, as seems possible at least, A = y and again (6) follows.
As several subsequent authors have pointed out, relation (6), knd the corresponding relations for individuals 2, 3 and 4, may or may not in fact hold, and this matter is not easily resolved empirically. We do not propose to join the debate on this issue since it is our aim in the next section to ·show that whether these inequalities (or the opposite ones) hold or not makes no difference for the choice of the appropriate rate of discount for benefit-cost analysis. But for the moment, suppose that these inequalities do hold, as in (6;. Consider a
collective contract o the above type earning a rate o return r , rather than p, such that du
1 Solving for r we obtain (7) 3 13 1 1 which, with either y =A or u 3 = u 4 becomes, utilizing (3), (/-,) This is what Marglin and Seri each call the "social" rate of discount.
This discount rate is not reflected in individual market behavior, as distinct from P, which is called the "private" rate of discount. Given
, from (6) and (8) There is a value of r for each individual in each generation and strong additional assumptions are needed to guarantee that they are the same.
It seems somewhat odd to call such an individual discount rate the "social" rate when it is, in a very real sense, more "private" than p, the market i rate. Nevertheless, r applies to collective savings d.ecisions, while P applies to individual ones. Furthermore, however the aggregation problem of moving from the set ~ ri 'to "the;' social rate of discount, r,
. i is resolved, it seems clear that since ri < p for all i, r < .P as well.
Acting collectively, it seems, the members of society are prepared to undertake investments that, acting individually, they are not. 6
To see the significance of ri~ imagine the introduction of a small public project which, to keep the example simple, affects the eonsumption of the two individuals in each generation equally. 
Suppose we have somehow determined the changes in final consumption in each period induced hy the project. To determine whether indivjdual lhas been made better off or worse off, it seems from (10) that the weight to be applied to the change in consumption in period 1 relative to that and Sen (1972] that r = r = r. Then it seems that if we grant the existence of the isolation paradox, implying r < p, there is good reason for thinking that the appropriate discount rate for benefit-cost analysis is the "soc,ial'' rate of discount, r, a conclusion that has been widely accepted in the literature. But we shall now sr·ow that this argument is erroneous.
III. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS OF A PROJECT
Suppose now that a "small" public (or private) investment project is adopted and can be described by a vector of net returns to the five individuals, spread out over the three periods. 8 If all these net returns were positive (negative) the project would be unambiguously desirable (undersirable) and benefit-cost analysis would be unnecessary. To keep the problem non-trivial we suppose that at least one of these net returns is negative and at least one is positive. Let the net returns in period 0 x from project x sum to B 0 , divided among individuals 1 and 2 in the pro- Now divide (13) and (14) by (1 + p) and divide (15) 
Thus one constraint that the adjustment of consumption levels must satisfy is that the net present value of the stream of consumption changes, discounted at the rate p, must he equal to the net present value of the returns of the project, ,also discounted at the rate p. We shall refer to the latter, the right hand side of (16), as Nx. Next, there are four equilibrium conditions p relating to the voluntary donations of individuals 1 throught 4, described for individual 1 by (3), which must also be satisfied if these individuals are to have positive savings before and after the project is adopted. Differentiating these equations totally and incorporating (1~) we obtain the system: (3)). Individuals affected disproportionately favorably respond by increasing their voluntary donations until their private savings equilibrium is restored. The first constraint on these adjustments is given by (16); the net present value of the stream of changes in consumption must sum to the net present value of 12 the project, both discounted at the market rate of discount. These two aspects of the problem, the "smoothing out" effect implied by the adjustments restoring a private savings equilibrium and the constraint on this process given by the net present value of the project, have not been explicitly incorporated into the analysis in the earlier literature, which was essentially partial equilibrium in character. The failure to view the impact of public projects within a general equilibrium context has led to a critical error.
A second set of constraints on the above adjustments is given by the assumption that individuals 1 through 4 have positive consumption and savings, both before and after the project is introduced. That is
and i a l , .. ,,5, (2 3) . i
where dy is a shorthand notation for the change in individual i's income -due to the project and due to chan~es in his receipts for the previous generation. We assume that the project is sufficiently "small" that positivity constraints (22) and (23) are not violated. The adjustments of private voluntary savings re qui red to restore the private savings equilibriur., as induced by the project, are all assumed to be feasible. If the project was "large" and the difference between the initial impact of the project on eachindividual and its final general equilibrium impact was also lar~e, some of the required adjustments could be infeasible.
Finally, we consider the generalization of our results. Our results extend immediately to n generations. So far as the first n-1 generations are concerned, no restrictions on the numher of individuals involved in each, or on the way the total net returns to generatioa t, Bt' is distributed within that generatio~need be introduced. This is seen readily be examining equations (11) and occurs because that generation necessarily has no savings variable itself which it can adjust, a problem which is essentially an artifact of using finite period models. Nevertheless, to guarantee that all the dci variables for the members of the fin~l generation have the same sign it is necessary to introduce a separate redistributional mechanism (for the final generation alone) or to impose the restriction that the savings of the previous generation and the returns from the project are distributed among the nembers of the final generation in the same non-negative proportions.
-18-IV. THE "SOCIAL" RATE OF DISCOUNT :Ai.~D THE SHADOW PRICE OF CAPITAL
The existence of an isolation paradox of the type identified by Eckstein, Sen and Marglin has been used as a rationale for a benefit-cost methodology differing in two essential ways from the calculation of ~ as above. The first difference concerns the rate of discount, as we have explained in Section II. The second concerns the introduction of a "shadow price of capital". This parameter reflects the value of consumption, present and future, foregone by drawing the necessary capital into the public sector to set up the project. In Marglin [1963b] and Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen [1972] ·the calculation of the shadow price of capital is discussed at length. All the expressions presented are described as approximations to the appropriate shadow price, even though most are quite complicated, and we do not propose to discuss their details here.13All depend, in various ways, on the private rate of discount, p, and the "social" rate of discount, r, K and have the property that for r < p, S ~ 1. What is clear is that the shadow price of capital is the same for all "small" projects, assuming they are financed in the same way.
In the previous section we argued that when there is inter-generational benvolence, and whether the isolation paradox holds or not, projects can be ranked according to their welfare effects by means of their net present value at the market rate of discount. At best, any alternative benefit-cost analysis procedure will give equivalent results.
The question we wish to raise is whether the "social" rate of discount/ Table 1 Details of Hypothetical Projects Table 1 (assumed "small"), we find using (24) that :N = ~ = 0. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has employed a simple general equilibrium model of inter-generational benevolence to examine the validity of a widely accepted claim based on the new-famous ''prisoner's dilemma" problem.
This claim is that the existence of a special form of inter-generational benevolence, known as the isolation paradox case, implies that the rate of discount used in benefit-cost analysis should be below the mar~et (private) rate of discount. We have found that the argum~nt cannot be sustained and have attempted to show that the appropriate rate of discount is the market rate, whether the isolation paradox exists or not.
Under relatively weak assumptions, the existence of inter-generational benevclence implies that the calculation of the net present value of a project at the market rate of discount provides an unambiguous indicator of the effects of the project on the welfare of each individual, regardless of the distributional impact of the project, a much stronger result than can be shown in the absence of inter-generational benevolence. The case for this benefit-cost rule is strengthened, rather than weakened, hy the existence of inter-generational transfers, even when the isolation paradox holds. Alternative benefit-cost procedures, involving the calculation of a "social rate of discount" and a "shadow price of capital" are informationally more costly and could at best provide equivalent iesults; hut we have attempted to show that such an equivalence is not possible in general.
Finally, we wish to make it clear that the results of this paper cast no doubt on the analytical validity, intellectual interest, or potential social importance of the isolation paradox argument itself,
-22-or of other, similar forms of the "prisoner's dilemma" framework. What we have questioned is one particular, but important, application of this analysis: the claim that, in an economy where private savings for benevolent purposes and public (or private) investment coexist, projects
should be discounted at a rate below the market rate of discount. It remains true that if the isolation paradox holds, the equilihriurn under private savings is not Pareto optimal; but discounting public (or private) investment at a rate other than the market rate of discount does not represent an opportunity for achieving a welfare gain. Public policies seldom, if ever, resemble the form of all-embracing social contract envisaged in the isolation paradox argument (specifying that each person increase his total savings by one unit). Public policies are superimposed on the actions of private. decision-makers, who then adjust, and when these adjustments are taken into account the story changes dramatically.
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